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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent reform of the American health care system has been bait-and-switch. The
bait is populist rhetoric; the switch is reregulation. The Obama Administration (the
Administration) promises us one thing but gives us something else. Administration
experts assure us that what we are getting is what we should prefer, if we could be trusted
to make good decisions for ourselves. Amid the comprehensive federal health reform
debate culminating in passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(ACA or Affordable Care Act), 1 President Obama promised, "if you like your health
*Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. I am grateful to Dean Agrawal and Professor
Hovenkamp for inviting me to participate in this Symposium on "Reregulation and the Business Firm," Brad
Flynt (University of Georgia, J.D./M.B.A. 2011) for initial ideas for this project, my co-panelists, David
Orentlicher and Amy Monahan, for a stimulating discussion, and Tim Jost and Peter Jacobson for excellent
comments and suggestions for improving the draft.
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plan, you can keep your health plan." 2 If you were already happy with your current health
care plan, nothing would have to change. 3 The Affordable Care Act codified that promise
as the "grandfather rule." 4 This Article examines the validity of the promise, concluding
that, in fact, our plans will change and will have to comply with ACA's extensive new
federal health insurance regulatory regime. It may well be that we will neither notice nor
object to the changes. Nevertheless, the reality is different than the rhetoric.
This Article describes the operation of the Affordable Care Act's grandfather rule as
one example of the Obama Administration's decidedly paternalistic approach to
reregulation, despite sounding populist themes. 5 For a presidential candidate who touted
his community organizer roots, 6 the Administration's methodology is notably top-down
and expert-driven. Rather than convince the electorate of the merits of sometimes
controversial reforms, the Administration has shown a preference for proceeding through
the executive branch rulemaking process. Through this approach, the Administration
leaves politically popular promises apparently undisturbed while otherwise bringing
about the desired changes through less transparent, more expedited channels. The trend is
especially evident in the context of federal health reform.
Before returning to ACA's grandfather rule, consider two additional examples of
regulatory paternalism amid health reform: first, the "death panels" controversy, which
arose from a House proposal to provide Medicare coverage for end-of-life counseling
between patients and doctors.7 Popular protest over the grossly misperceived provision as
authorizing government panels of experts to make end-of-life decisions for patients
resulted in Congress striking it from the Bill.8 Then, several months after the Affordable
Care Act passed, the very same Medicare end-of-life counseling provision reappeared

1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by
Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
2. See President Barack Obama, remarks in Town Hall on Health Care, Central High School, Grand
Junction, Colorado (Aug. 15, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thejpress-office/Remarks-ByThe-President-In-Town-Hall-On-Health-Care-Grand-Junction-Colorado/ ("Nobody is going to force you to
leave your health care plan. If you like your doctor, you keep seeing your doctor. I don't want government
bureaucrats meddling in your health care.").
3. See, e.g., id and accompanying text (quoting President Obama's August 2009 health care town hall
meeting).
4. ACA § 1251(a)(1) ("Nothing in this Act (or an amendment made by this Act) shall be construed to
require that an individual terminate coverage under a group health plan or health insurance coverage in which
such individual was enrolled on the date of enactment of this Act.").
5. See Tom Cohen, Obama's Stump Speech Blends PartisanRhetoric with Populist Themes, CNN.coM,
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/08/19/obama.stump.speech/index.html (describing
President Obama as "honoring a humor-laced stump speech that is part pep talk, part populist ideology");
Michael Powell & Jeff Zeleny, Tagged as Elitist, Obama Shifts Campaign From High-Flown to Folksy, N.Y.
TIMES (May 6, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/06/us/politics/06obama.html?_r-1 &partnerrssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all (noting President Obama's shift in campaign strategy from "high-flown
to folksy").
6. See David Moberg, Obama's Community Roots, THE NATION (Apr. 16, 2007),
http://www.thenation.com/article/obamas-community-roots (discussing President Obama's background as a
community organizer).
7. H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. § 1233(a) (2009).
8. See Joshua E. Perry, A Missed Opportunity: Health Care Reform, Rhetoric, Ethics, and Economics at
the End of Life, 29 MIss. C. L. REv. 409, 411-12 (2010) (citing Sarah Palin's Facebook post and describing
controversy surrounding proposed Section 1233).
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deep within pages of regulatory rulemaking, backed by studies published in British and
American medical journals and unnamed "physicians, health care providers, and others." 9
After the media brought the rule to light,1 0 the end-of-life counseling provision was
quickly excised by regulatory amendment. 1 Although that particular attempt to bypass
the political process was thwarted, the sequence of events reveals the administration's
apparent deference to popular opinion followed by executive branch rulemaking to
achieve reregulatory objectives.
Another example of regulatory bait-and-switch involves the Affordable Care Act's
provision for state innovation waivers. As strong protest over the individual health
insurance mandate and other state-based objections mounted in the year after ACA's
enactment, 12 President Obama highlighted the possibility of state waivers from his hardfought signature legislation.1 3 Under ACA Section 1332, "Waiver for State Innovation,"
states may apply to the federal government for waivers from a number of specific ACA
requirements, effective January 1, 2017.14 In a speech to the National Governors
Association in February 2011, President Obama expressed support for amendments
allowing states to obtain waivers, including from the individual mandate, three years
sooner than 2017.15 Section 1332 and the President's willingness to fast-track state
waivers are consistent with popular preferences for state flexibility, innovation, and
diversity. 16
But the reality, again, belies the rhetoric. States may qualify for waivers only if they
can demonstrate that the coverage provided under their waiver plans will be "at least as
9. Medicare Program; Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B
for CY 2011; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 73,169, 73,406 (Nov. 29, 2010).
10. Robert Pear, Obama Returns to End-of-Life Plan that CausedStir, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010, at Al,
available at www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/us/politics/26death.html (stating the Obama administration used the
regulation writing process to achieve its goal); Death Panels Revisited, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970203731004576045702803914780.html
("The
regulatory
process isn't supposed to be a black-ops exercise, but expect many more such nontransparent improvisations
under the vast powers ObamaCare handed the executive branch.").
11. Medicare Program; Amendment to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other
Revisions to Part B for CY 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 1366, 1366 (Jan. 10, 2011).
12. See Jason Millman, Another State Wants HealthcareReform Waiver, HEALTHWATCH (Mar. 19, 2011,
9:48 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-implementation/150819-another-state-wantshealth-reform-waiver (listing states requesting waivers and noting that "[w]aivers have become a hot-button
issue for the administration almost a year into the law's implementation"); see generally Elizabeth Weeks
Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to FederalHealth Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 11 (2010) (examining state resistance to ACA).
13. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Kevin Sack, Obama Backs Easing State Health Law Mandates, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/us/politics/0lhealth.html.
14. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1332(a)(1), (2), 124 Stat. 119,
203-04 (2010) (listing ACA requirements subject to waiver); see Katherine Hayes & Sara Rosenbaum, Waivers
for State Innovation, HEALTH REFORM GPS (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/
waivers-for-state-innovation/ (listing essential health benefit requirement, exchanges, premium assistance,
employer responsibility, and individual mandate among waivable requirements).
15. See Stolberg & Sack, supranote 13 (discussing President Obama's support for state waivers).
16. See Preparingfor Innovation: ProposedProcessfor States to Adopt Innovative Strategies to Meet the
Goals of the Affordable Care Act, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/news/
factsheets/stateinnovation03 102011 a.html (describing proposed regulations, "[b]uilding on President Obama's
commitment to give states the flexibility to innovate and implement health care solutions that work best for
them").
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comprehensive" as the exchanges, with "coverage and cost sharing protections" that are
"as least as affordable" as ACA.17 States also must demonstrate that their plans will
provide coverage to "at least a comparable number of [state] residents" as ACA's
provisions and will not increase the federal deficit. 18 In effect, states may obtain waivers
only if they can, on their own, using different strategies, figure out how to achieve the
same coverage, consumer protection, and cost-containment goals as the comprehensive
federal legislation. Given the innumerable hours spent and compromises brokered in
order to enact ACA at the federal level, it seems a pipe-dream to suggest that states will
be able to come up with novel plans that meet the strict statutory and regulatory waiver
conditions. Accordingly, the broad federal requirements will almost certainly take effect
nationwide, with few if any meaningful state waivers granted. 19 The Administration
voices support for state innovation while effectively making federal law the only
plausible approach.
Similarly, ACA's grandfather rule promises that we can keep our health plans, but in
reality, our health plans will likely not be able to keep their grandfathered status for very
long. Section 1251 of the Affordable Care Act expressly preserves plans in existence on
the date of enactment, 20 March 23, 2010, and excepts them from a number of new federal
requirements under ACA. 2 1 Like the end-of-life counseling and state innovation waiver
provisions, the Administration enacted reregulation not at the level of public,
congressional debate, but through the intricacies of administrative rulemaking. The
regulations implementing ACA's grandfather rule establish narrow parameters for plans
to retain grandfathered status. 2 2 In essence, plans can make changes only for the benefit
of plan participants and at the expense of the plan. 23 Under those strictures, it will be
nearly impossible for most plans to meet the requirements; accordingly, most will almost
surely forfeit grandfathered status.
The Administration acknowledges that grandfathered plans will likely cease to exist
within a few years of ACA's enactment, but assures us that we will not notice the change

17. ACA § 1332(b)(1)(A), (B); see also Application, Review, and Reporting Process for Waivers for State
Innovation, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,553, 13,561 (proposed Mar. 14, 2011) (to be codified as 31 C.F.R. §
33.108(a)(2)(iv)(C)(4)(i), (ii)) (listing and explaining application conditions).
18. ACA § 1332(b)(1)(C), (D); see also 76 Fed. Reg. at 13,561 (proposed Mar. 14, 2011) (to be codified
as 31 C.F.R. § 33.108(a)(2)(iv)(C)(4)(iii), (iv)).
19. So far, states have obtained waivers for very modest variations from ACA's requirements, such as
Maine's waiver from the medical-loss ratio, or very sweeping reforms that were not politically viable at the
federal level, such as Vermont's single-payer plan. See Letter from Steven B. Larsen, Deputy Adm'r &
Director, Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to Mila Kofman, Superintendent of Ins., State of Me.
(Mar. 8, 2011), available at
of Ins.,
Dep't of Prof'1 & Fin. Regulation
Bureau
http://healthreform.kfforg/-/media/Files/KHS/docfinder/mainewaiver.pdf; Press Release, Bernie Sanders, U.S.
Senator for Vt. (Feb. 28, 2011), available at http://sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/news/?id=44a664de-8e9243f4-a87 1-d26e0b5a252d.
20. ACA § 1251(a)(1) ("Nothing in this Act (or an amendment made by this Act) shall be construed to
require that an individual terminate coverage under a group health plan or health insurance coverage in which
such individual was enrolled on the date of enactment of this Act.").
21. See infra Part V.B (describing exemptions).
22. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as Grandfathered Health Plan
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538 (proposed June 17, 2010) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) [hereinafter Grandfathering Rules].
23. See infra Part VI.A (describing implementing regulations).
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or will prefer our new ACA plans anyway. 24 But that was not the promise. The bait-andswitch approach to reregulation risks credibility and trust. Moreover, the Administration
achieves its ends not through direct, accountable processes, but indirectly by establishing
regulatory parameters that will all but force plans to give up grandfathered status and
comply with ACA. In effect, when you lose your health plan, you will blame your plan,
your insurer, or your employer, not the government. The Administration, which wrote the
regulations setting the requirements for grandfathered plans, technically upholds its
deregulatory promise but at the same time achieves its reregulatory agenda.
II. BACKGROUND
Political observers and cognitive scientists have offered various explanations for the
Republican Party's apparently greater success at controlling the political message and
framing issues in ways that resonate with voters. 25 The suggestion is that Republicans are
willing to appeal to the public's emotions and cognitive biases. 26 Democrats, on the other
hand, cling to an enlightenment view of the electorate as dispassionate, rational thinkers
who can be convinced of the right choice if given the facts, statistics, and science to
support it.2 7 Republicans, to great success, dismiss Democrats' intellectualism as "fuzzy
math" and Ivy League elitism. 2 8 Bill Clinton was one recent Democratic politician who
took a chapter out of the Republican playbook and succeeded with emotional appeals and
messaging. 29 President Obama, our current Democratic "Professor in Chief," similarly
made a concerted effort to overcome the Republicans' characterization of him as an
unemotional, bookish leader. 30 His rhetoric is bottom-up, self-determinative, and deeply
democratic. 3 1 But in reality President Obama demonstrates a strong preference for expert

24. Questions and Answers: Keeping the Health Plan You Have: The Affordable Care Act and
'Grandfathered'Health Plans, HEALTHREFORM.Gov, http://www.healthreform.gov/about/grandfathering.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Questions and Answers] ("If a plan loses its grandfathered status, then
consumers in these plans will gain additional new benefits .... ).
25. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND 12 (2008) (asserting that Republicans "have a better

sense of how brains and minds work. That's why they are more effective."); DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL
BRAIN 13 (2007) ("Republican strategists have recognized since the days of Richard Nixon that the road to
victory is paved with emotional intentions.").
26. See LAKOFF, supra note 25, at 33-35; WESTEN, supra note 25, at 12-13.
27. See LAKOFF, supra note 25, at 51-60 (criticizing "neoliberals for assuming that just citing facts and
figures will carry the day politically, when what is needed is an honest, morally based framing of the facts and
figures"); WESTEN, supra note 25, at 25-26 (describing social contract philosophy that the Framers followed,
assuming that "people came together to create a state and govem themselves through rational autonomous
choice"); see also Dan M. Kahan, The CognitivelyIlliberalState, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 116-17, 119-22 (2007)
(suggesting that "we lack the psychological capacity . . . to make, interpret, and administer law without
indulging sensibilities pervaded by our attachments to highly contested visions of the good").
28. See WESTEN, supra note 25, at 31-34 (recounting George W. Bush's response to Al Gore in the 2000
Presidential debate: "Look at this man who has great numbers. He talks about numbers. I'm beginning to think
not only did he invent the internet, but he invented the calculator. It's fuzzy math.").
29. See id. at 1-7; Jedediah Purdy, PresidentialPopularConstitutionalism,77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837,
1858-62 (2009) (describing Clinton's presidential rhetoric as extolling personal virtue).
22,
2009),
(July
TIMEs
Chief, N.Y.
Professor in
Paul
Krugman,
30. See
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/professor-in-chief/; Professorin Chief, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb.
20, 2010), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/02/10/obama.
31. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text (introducing the idea that the Affordable Care Act is an
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decision-making and a firm guiding hand. 32 Consistent with that approach, the
Administration hired some of the academy's brightest minds to nudge Americans in the
right direction. 33
President Obama's perhaps most effective slogan in the health reform debate is the
promise, "if you like your health plan, you can keep your health plan." 34 The promise
was initially made in response to the proposed "public option" health plan and was
intended to assuage fears that inserting even an optional government health insurance
plan into the mix would dramatically alter existing market dynamics, effectively forcing
employers out of the business of health insurance. 35 The proposed public option was
dropped from the congressional health reform bills, but President Obama stuck with the
36
slogan, repeating it on White House health reform websites and to various audiences.

example of the Obama Administration's "paternalistic approach to reregulation, despite sounding populist
themes").
32. See LAKOFF, supra note 25, at xvi (describing Obama's view of government as "a nurturant family" in
which "it is a parent's responsibility to protect or empower his or her children and to instill an ethic of
excellence . . . . The ethic of excellence can be seen in his choice of cabinet members, all clearly well-known
and respected for their competence. And it shows in the priority he has given to education.").
33. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (introducing "libertarian paternalism" and "choice architecture"
strategies to nudge individuals toward better choices for themselves, their families, and society); Michael
Grunwald, How Obama Is Using the Science of Change, TIME (Apr. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1889153,00.html (describing Obama's "nudge factor" as his
campaign promise to bring change to America); Jonathan Weisman, Economic Policy 'Nudge' Gives Way to a
Shove, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2010), http://online.wsj.com (noting Sunstein's "co-author of the behavioralist
bible" position at the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and other behavioral
economists' posts in the Administration).
34. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (quoting President Obama's health reform town hall
meeting).
35. See David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance:Is Health Reform a "Game Changer?"
11 n.25 (Univ. of Ill. Pub. L. and Legal Theory Research Paper, No. 10-17, 2010), available at
(explaining how employment-based coverage
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1624311
"became such an important part of American health policy, and evaluat[ing] the likely impact of [ACA]");
Helen Darling, Health Care Reform: Perspectives From Large Employers, HEALTH AFF. 1220, 1220-21
(2010), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/6/1220.full.pdf ("Most large employers favored
health reform, but they were relieved when the public option was eliminated.").
36. See Hyman, supranote 35, at 11-12 (citing when Senator Obama's promise "if you like your coverage
you can keep it" was used); see, e.g., Obama Addresses Physicians at AMA Meeting: Transcript of President
Obama's Remarks, Am. MED. Assoc., 2009 Annual Meeting of the AMA House of Delegates (June 15, 2009),
http://www.ama-assn.org/amalpub/about-ama/our-people/house-delegates/2009-annual-meeting/speeches/
president-obama-speech.shtml ("No matter how we reform health care, we will keep this promise: if you like
your doctor, you will be able to keep your doctor."); Stephanie Cutter, Yes, You Can Keep Your Health Plan,
THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (May 18, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ 2010/05/18/yes-you-can-keepyour-health-plan ("The bottom line is that the Act allows people to keep the insurance they have, while also
providing more and better options for all."); Macon Phillips, Facts Are Stubborn Things, THE WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Facts-Are-Stubborn-Things (referring to Linda
Douglass's health reform video); Keeping the Health Plan You Have: The Affordable Care Act and
"Grandfathered" Health Plans, Fact Sheet under Newsroom, HEALTHREFORM.GOv (June 14, 2009),
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/keeping the health plan_youhavegrandfathered.
html [hereinafter Newsroom] (attempting to debunk "the myth that reform will force you out of your current
insurance plan"); Questions andAnswers, supra note 24 ("The new [grandfather rule] will allow you to keep
your current coverage if you like it.").
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As a matter of framing, the promise works on several fronts. 3 7 It allays voters'
concerns about "socialized medicine" and "big government." The implicit rejection of the
public option or robust federal regulation of the health insurance market comports with
the public's apparent preference for private, market-based solutions. 38 The slogan
champions individual rights, freedom of choice, self-reliance, and other endemic
American libertarian values. 39 In that view, deregulation, not reregulation, is the
preferred approach. 4 0 President Obama vocally embraced the rhetoric of deregulation 41
while still pursuing a strongly reregulatory agenda. 42 That equivocal messaging is
demonstrated by the Administration's approach to implementing ACA's grandfather
rule. 43
The "you can keep your health plan" promise also appeals to Americans' status quo
bias and loss aversion. 44 We fear giving up a known quantity for something unknown and

37. See LAKOFF, supra note 25, at 140-44 (discussing the framing of the health care debate); Marjorie E.
Komhauser, Cognative Theory and the Delivery of Welfare Benefits, 40 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 256 (2009)
(describing different frames for social welfare policies). On framing political messages generally, see GEORGE
LAKOFF, "DON'T EVEN THINK OF AN ELEPHANT! KNow YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004);
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 36-37; WESTEN, supra note 25, at 263-69.
38. George Lakoff terms this trend "privateering." See LAKOFF, supra note 25, at 133, 140-42
("Privateering is a special case of privatization in which the capacity of government to carry out critical moral
missions is systematically destroyed from within the government itself, while public funds are used to provide
capital for private corporations to take over those critical functions of government."); see also Darling, supra
note 35, at 1220 ("[T]he law actually reflects a very centrist philosophy, with strong support for a mostly private
sector approach to health care.").
39. See LAKOFF, supra note 25, at 62-63 (suggesting that both conservative and neoliberal perspectives
favor free trade and individual wealth maximization); Kahan, supra note 27, at 122-23 (contrasting
individualistic and communitarian world views); Komhauser, supra note 37, at 258 ("Since Americans treasure
individualism, self-reliance, and independence, they value the free market as the mechanism that best allows the
individual to flourish."); see also Purdy, supra note 29, at 1857 (describing Nixon's vision, as one example),
1864-65, 1870 (noting presidential rhetoric that "takes on the new circumstances of individuality, diversity,
consumerism, and the centrality of markets").
40. See LAKOFF, supra note, 25 at 63 ("The myth is that the deregulation or privatization of a moral
mission of government eliminates government."); Purdy, supra note 29, at 1845-52 (describing early
presidents' vision).
41. See Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2011),
("[T]hroughout our
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703396604576088272112103698.html
history, one of the reasons the free market has worked is that we have sought the proper balance. We have
preserved freedom of commerce while applying those rules and regulations necessary to protect the public
against threats to our health and safety and to safeguard people and businesses from abuse . . . . Over the past
two years, the goal of my administration has been to strike the right balance."); Robert Scheer, Obama Pulls a
Clinton on Deregulation, THE NATION (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/157865/obama-pullsclinton-deregulation (comparing President Obama's regulatory stance to former President Clinton's).
42. See Binyamin Appelbaum & Edward Wyatt, Obama May Find Useless Regulations Are Scarcer Than
Thought, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/22regulate.html? r-l&ref
=binyaminappelbaum (noting that the "Obama administration has championed expansions of financial and
health care regulation, and it has toughened a wide range of other rules"); Eric Lipton, With Obama,
Regulations Are Back in Fashion, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/13/us/politics/
13rules.html (commenting on the "new age of regulation [that] is well under way in Washington").
43. See infra Part VI (discussing regulations implementing the grandfather rule).
44. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 33-35; Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 609-12 (1998).
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untested.4 5 Our calculus may not even get that far; we may simply prefer to stay with our
current plan rather than expend energy and resources to switch. 46 Our current health
plans, for all their exclusions and restrictions, may be the coffee mug that we cherish
simply because we already have it. 47 President Obama's promise comports with and does
not challenge our biases. Instead, the regulatory paternalism approach gradually, and
largely without our notice, replaces our current plans with new, ACA-compliant plans
through operation of the executive branch regulations implementing the grandfather rule.
If the strategy is successful, the Administration stands to gain on both the merits of health
reform and the politics of messaging. The strategy turns the individualism, privateering
frame on its head, casting private actors-insurers and employers-as the bad guys and
big government as the white horse, riding in with a host of reforms that we might not
have thought we wanted but, the Administration assures us, we will come to appreciate.
III. THE RHETORIC: You CAN KEEP YOUR HEALTH PLAN

For most Americans-61% of the non-elderly population, or 160.6 million
people 4 8-our current health insurance plan is an employer-based plan. The United
States' reliance on employer-based health insurance is a product of historical
anachronism but is deeply entrenched. 49 Wage-hour laws, tax rules, and union pressure
combined to create strong incentives for employers to offer health benefits, although they
are not required to do so. 50 The tax code provides the strongest incentive, allowing
employers above-the-line exemption for income spent on employee benefit plans. 5 1 At
the same time, employers may deduct the cost of purchasing health insurance for their

45. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 34 ("Loss aversion helps produce inertia, meaning a strong
desire to stick with your current holdings.").
46. Id. at 35 (describing the "yeah, whatever" heuristic and noting that even when switching costs are very
slight we are disinclined to change).
47. See Korobkin, supra note 44, at 627-28 (describing experiments randomly endowing subjects with
either a coffee mug or six dollars and finding that mug holders tended to value the mugs twice as high as cash
holders).
48. Stephen Blakely, Employers, Workers, and the Future of Employment-Based Health Benefits, EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST., Feb. 2010, at 3, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI IB_022010 No339_EB-Bens.pdf; Kathryn Linehan, Self-Insurance and the PotentialEffects of Health Reform on the
Small Group Market, NAT'L HEALTH POL'Y F., at 2 (Dec. 21 2010), available at
http://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/1B840_PPACASmallGroup_12-21-I0.pdf, Hyman, supra note 35, at
4-5.
49. See John Bronsteen et al., ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in the United States,
76 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2297, 2300-02 (2008) (discussing the prevalence of health care as an employee benefit);
David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y, L. & ETHIcs 23, 25-26 (2001) (discussing the historical rise of employment-based coverage).
50. See I.R.C. § 106 (2006) ("[G]ross income of an employee does not include employer-provided
coverage under an accident or health plan."); Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 25.
51. 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006) ("gross income of an employee does not include employer-provided
coverage under an accident or health plan"); Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 25; see also James F. Blumstein,
The Clinton AdministrationHealth Care Reform Plan: Some PreliminaryThoughts, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y
& L. 201, 203 n.2 (noting incentives for private sector health care delivery, including "the unlimited tax
deductibility of employer outlays on health insurance"); Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care
Reform: Rethinking the Tax Treatment of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1229,
1229-32 (describing tax treatment of employer-sponsored health insurance).
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employees as a business expense. 52 Employers are better off providing generous health
insurance and maintaining a productive, healthy workforce. At the same time, if
employers simply increase salary or wages to cover the cost of employees' purchasing
insurance on their own, employees would not receive the same tax benefit for their health
plan expenditures. Beyond the economic incentives, we simply have come to expect
health insurance as part of employment compensation. 53
Rather than radically changing the predominantly employer-based system, ACA
incorporates employer health insurance as a core component of the reforms. Employer
health plans operate as a baseline from which ACA's substantive new requirements for
all health plans are defined. For example, ACA defines "essential health benefits," which
54
plans sold under the exchanges must cover, by reference to the "typical employer plan."
Also, the grandfather rule purports to preserve existing employer health plans, providing
that nothing in the Affordable Care Act "shall be construed to require that an individual
terminate coverage under a group health plan or health insurance coverage in which such
individual was enrolled on the date of enactment of this Act." 55 Then-existing plans that
meet certain requirements are "grandfathered" and apparently may continue to operate as
they have before ACA, as alternatives to new plans issued after ACA. 56 Accordingly, for
the majority of Americans already covered by employer-based plans, ACA appears to
maintain the status quo.
Although the statutory language of ACA is true to the "you can keep your health
plan" promise, the implementing regulations belie it. In combined administrative
rulemaking by the Departments of Labor, Treasury, and Health and Human Services,
federal regulators developed a specific list of changes that would cause plans to lose
grandfathered status. 57 Closer examination of those regulations, as well as attention to
other provisions of ACA bearing on employer and employee incentives, reveal that most
employer health plans will fairly quickly relinquish grandfathered status. 58 According to
52. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (allowing deduction for "reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered"); Joondeph, supranote 51, at 1229 (noting same).
53. See Leslie Pickering Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1881, 1887-88 (1992) (describing evolution of expectations for job-related health insurance); cf Joondeph,
supra note 51, at 1248 (noting that employers are "the dominant vehicle through which Americans purchase
their health insurance" and challenges of separating health insurance from employment).
54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119,
163-64 (2010).
55. Id. § 1251(a).
56. See, e.g., id. § 2715 (requiring uniform explanation of coverage documents and standardized
definitions); id. § 2718 (requiring clear accounting for costs); Bernadette Fernandez, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41166, GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLANS UNDER PPACA (P.L. 111-148) 2 (2010), available at
http://cobum.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&Fileid=ebc9c6f3-6ca8-47c9-a5fc-ab9488ddf61c;
Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Grandfathered Plans, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 15, 2010),
http://healthaffairs.orgfblog/2010/06/15/implementing-health-reform-grandfathered-plans/
[hereinafter Jost,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG].

57. See Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,543-44 (June 17, 2010) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. § 147.140(g)) (listing changes that would result in cessation of grandfather status); infra Part VI
(describing regulations).
58. Press Release, Mercer, Even as Reform Pushes up Benefit Cost, Employers Will Take Steps to Hold
2011 Increase to 5.9% (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://www.mercer.con/press-releases/1391585 (reporting
results of employer survey regarding cost advantages of changing plans versus retaining grandfathered status);
Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Health Overhaul to Force Changes in Employer Plans, ABC NEWS, June 11, 2010,
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the Administration's own health reform website, the most hopeful estimates are that 66%
of large employers and 51% of small employers will retain grandfathered status by
2013.59 The most pessimistic estimates are that only 36% of large employers and a mere
20% of small employer plans will be grandfathered in 2013.60 Estimates for the
individual market suggest that grandfathered plans will be practically nonexistent over
the next few years. 6 1
In response to the question whether employer health plans will eventually lose their
grandfathered status, the Administration's consumer-oriented online health reform guide
assures' us that the grandfather rule "helps to implement the Affordable Care Act" and
"put[s] us on a glide path toward the competitive, patient-centered market of the
future." 62 Further, we are comforted that "[i]f a plan loses its grandfathered status, then
consumers in these plans will gain additional benefits" and that the grandfather rule "is
designed to strike a balance between allowing existing plans to make routine changes and
preventing plans from making such large changes that they are no longer the plans people
once had and liked." 63 Most cynically, the strategy is a form of illiberal paternalism to
"help" us get past our irrational preference for the status quo and accept the new-andimproved reregulated federal health insurance regime. Most generously, it replaces
employer paternalism with government paternalism.
The evolution of the "you can keep your health plan" promise from political
rhetoric, to statutory provision, to administrative rulemaking, to market incentives, is
much more than a libertarian paternalistic nudge. 64 While the approach appears to
preserve our freedom to choose between an existing grandfathered plan and a new ACAregulated plan, in operation, existing plans will almost surely disappear. The regulatory
strategy obscures the government's accountability and privatizes blame. This strategy
makes it appear that insurers and employers, not the government, broke the promise.
When plans inevitably fail to operate within the regulatory requirements and lose
grandfathered status, Americans will blame their plan administrators. As a result, the
federal government achieves a policy goal of requiring all health plans to comply with
new coverage, underwriting, and operational requirements without expending political
capital to get there. 6 5
availableat http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10890753.
59. See Newsroom, supra note 36 (projecting the percent of large and small employers that will retain
grandfather status in 2013); see also Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,553 tbl.3 (estimating that
49% of small employers and 34% of large employers will relinquish grandfathered status by 2013).
60. See Newsroom, supra note 36; Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,553 tbl.3 (estimating that
80% of small employers and 64% of large employers will relinquish grandfathered status by 2013).
61. Newsroom, supra note 36; see also Jost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG, supra note 56 (concluding that
"relatively few [individual] policies will remain grandfathered for any significant period of time").
62. Fact Sheet: Keeping the Health Plan You Have: The Affordable Care Act and "Grandfathered"
Health Plans, HEALTHREFORM.GOv, http://www.healthreform.gov/newsroon/keeping thehealth Planyou
have.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
63. Questions andAnswers, supranote 24.
64. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 33, at 229-35 (describing examples of "[a] Dozen Nudges").
65. A similar dynamic operates between federal and state governments in the context of conditional
spending programs. The federal government incentivizes states to implement federal policies, but leaves states
bearing the brunt of public resistance to the new program. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997)
("By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program,
Members of Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for
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IV. DEREGULATION OF EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE: ERISA
Before ACA, federal regulation of health insurance was relatively limited. For much
of the existence of health insurance plans, they were regulated, if at all, at the state
level. 66 Insurance companies are incorporated and licensed under state law. 67 States'
reserved powers accord them primary authority to regulate insurance, as affirmed by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.6 8 Under that power, states have imposed various requirements,
including coverage mandates, rate regulation, and consumer protection rules. 69 The
number and diversity of separate state requirements became increasingly burdensome as
firms expanded and operated nationwide. 70 As employer health plans became more
prevalent, employers and insurers sought relief in uniform federal regulations.71
The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), aimed
the solutions . . . ."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("[W]here the Federal Government
compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.").
66. See Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 644-45 (1994)
(noting that "before ERISA state law was viewed as the primary source of standards for plans" and discussing
paucity of state laws); Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunitiesand
Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 89 (2009) ("Traditionally, states are responsible for regulating health care
delivery, and litigation against health care providers is resolved under state law."); Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D.
Kinney, The Road Paved With Good Intentions: Problems and Potentialfor Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance Under ERISA, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 33 (1999) (noting that states' inherent police powers include
the authority to regulate insurance).
67. See Strain & Kinney, supra note 66, at 34 (noting that states historically have regulated insurance
companies that operate in their borders); Stephanie Kanwit, The Purchase of Insurance Across State Lines in
the Individual Market, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152, 153 (2009) ("Under current law, companies may only sell
policies to individuals who reside or work in the state in which the company is licensed (although large insurers
license products in every state).").
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006) (reversing United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553
(1944)) (extending federal antitrust authority to the business of insurance) ("No Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .").
69. Strain & Kinney, supra note 66, at 33-34 (describing state regulations); BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41069, SELF-INSURED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 2 (2010), available at

http://www.achp.org/themes/ACPHMain/files/CRS Report-Self-Insured-May2OlO.pdf (describing various
types of state laws regulating insurance).
70. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 68-69 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing industry
concerns, including increasing number of self-insured employer health plans underlying ERISA preemption
scheme); Corey J. Ayling, New Developments in ERISA Preemption and Judicial Oversight of Managed Care,
31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 403, 404-05 (1998) (describing historical context for ERISA enactment, noting the
prevalence of employer health insurance plans by 1974); Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502
Implied Preemption, Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 118
(2001) (noting ERISA's objective of "relieving large employers from the headache of complying with multiple
and divergent state and local regulations").
71. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) (citing legislative history, including
concern about conflicting state laws); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 745-46 n.23 (citing same);
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 (1983) (citing legislative history emphasizing the goal of
uniformity and concern over eliminating "conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee
benefit plans"); Mary A. Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism:Barriers to IncreasingHealth Care Access for the
Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 274-76 (1990) (discussing the uniformity goal of ERISA); Conison,
9
supra note 66, at 646 n. 8, 647 n.103 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 2364 (1973); 120 CONG. REC. 29, 197
(1974) (statement of Rep. Dent)); Strain & Kinney, supranote 66, at 30 (describing factors leading to increased
federal regulation of employee benefits).
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primarily at underfunded employer pension plans, also nominally addressed employer
health plans. 72 As a product of eleventh hour compromise, ERISA contains a perplexing,
push-me-pull-me preemption scheme. 7 3 At first, ERISA section 514 broadly preempts
any and all state laws that "relate to" employer health plans. 74 Section 514's broad
preemption would seem to alleviate employers and insurance companies that offer
employer health plans of the burden of complying with inconsistent, diverse state
regulation. 75 But states, concerned with the usurpation of their traditional authority to
regulate insurance companies operating within their borders, 76 lobbied for an exception,
which "saves" any state laws that regulate insurance from broad ERISA preemption.77
Not content to let states reclaim too much regulatory discretion, large group employers
sought an exception to the exception, providing that self-insured plans in which the
employer itself bears the risk of employees' health care costs shall not be "deemed"
insurers for purposes of state regulation. 78 Even after ACA, self-insured plans remain
fairly comfortable within ERISA preemption and free from state regulation. 79 More than
half of all individuals with private health insurance are enrolled in self-insured plans.80
The beauty of the ERISA preemption compromise, from the perspective of the firm,
is that ERISA contains almost no substantive regulation of employer health plans. 8 1

72. Bronsteen et al., supra note 49, at 2302-03; Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 29.
73. See Conison, supra note 66, at 648-50 (describing conflicting constituent interests during ERISA
drafting); Strain & Kinney, supra note 66, at 45 (characterizing statutory scheme's effect on state regulatory
powers as "ERISA taketh away; ERISA giveth; ERISA taketh away again"); William Pierron & Paul Fronstin,
ERISA Pre-emption. Implicationsfor Health Reform and Coverage, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., Feb. 2008, at 46, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRIIB 02-20086.pdf (discussing ERISA legislative
history); see also MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 739 (acknowledging that the ERISA preemption scheme is "not
a model of legislative drafting").
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
75. See MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 739 (discussing ERISA's impact on insurance plans); Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (discussing the legislators' intent that the bill eliminate inconsistent
regulation of employee benefit plans).
76. See MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 739-40 ("[W]hile the general pre-emption clause broadly pre-empts
state law, the saving clause appears broadly to preserve the States' lawmaking power over much of the same
regulation."); Conison, supra note 66, at 646-49 (describing states' interests); Strain & Kinney, supra note 66,
at 46 ("[T]he savings clause creates a loophole that allows states to protect their citizens' interests through
regulation of health plans.").
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006).
78. Id. § I l44(b)(2)(B); Conison, supra note 66, at 648-49 (noting, in particular, concern over a Missouri
court decision "holding self-insured medical benefit plan to be insurance companies for purposes of state
regulation").
79. See generally FERNANDEZ, supra note 69, at 6 (tbl. 1) (demonstrating ACA provisions applicable to
self-insured plans); Tim Jost, How Does the Health Reform Legislation Affect Self-Insured Plans?, O'NEILL
INST. FOR NAT'L & GLOBAL HEALTH L., LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM (Mar. 31, 2010, 5:24 PM),
available at http://oneillhealthreform.wordpress.com/2010/03/31/how-does-the-health-reform-legislation-affectself-insured-plans/ [hereinafter Jost, LEGAL SOLUTIONS] (describing ACA provisions applicable to self-insured
plans); Linehan, supranote 48, at 4 (discussing self-insured plans in the context of health reform).
80. See FERNANDEZ, supra note 69, at 4 (noting that 55% of private-sector employees are enrolled in selfinsured plans); see also Linehan, supranote 48, at 3 (noting that 57% of employees are enrolled in a partially or
fully self-insured health plan).
81. See Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 29 ("The result of this statutory framework is to leave
employment-based health insurance effectively unregulated, since ERISA contains no substantive regulation of
health benefits."); Jacobson, supra note 66, at 89 (noting that ERISA provides "minimal federal regulation").
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Pension plans, which were the focus of the legislation, are subject to numerous particular
requirements under ERISA. 82 But the meat of ERISA, when it comes to health plans, is
the preemption scheme.8 3 ERISA's very few substantive requirements for health plans
include mental health parity, coverage of breast reconstruction after mastectomy, and
minimum hospital stays after birth of a child. 84 By and large, the law is deregulatory
when it comes to employer health plans. 85 Plans are exempt from most state regulation,
especially if they self-insure. At the same time, they do not face any particularly onerous
federal regulations under ERISA.
Subsequent federal laws, namely the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 86 and the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1986 (COBRA),8 7 impose additional requirements on employer group health
plans. Most relevant to the grandfather rule, HIPAA amended ERISA and prohibits group
health plans from discriminating on the basis of health status for enrollment, premiums,
and coverage. 88 Against this backdrop, ACA's extensive list of new substantive
requirements significantly expands federal regulation of health plans.
V. THE REALITY: IT DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU CONSIDER "YOUR PLAN"
The grandfather rule specifies that plans in existence as of the date of ACA's
enactment shall not be terminated, 89 but it does not promise that your plan will remain
forever unchanged. 90 ACA expressly exempts grandfathered plans from many, but
certainly not all, of the new federal requirements for health insurance plans. In one view,
those new requirements necessarily alter the plan that you currently have and thereby
break the promise. 9 1 In another view, ACA's exemptions and requirements for

82. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 49, at 2302-03 (noting "little doubt that ERISA was drafted and
passed with the primary aim of protecting employees' pension benefits" and that health benefit plans received
"scant attention during ERISA's coalescence"); Hyman & Hall, supra note 49, at 29 (noting that protecting
pension funds was ERISA's primary focus, and health benefits were included as an afterthought).
83. See Bobinski, supra note 71, at 277 ("Given the lack of substantive regulation, the most significant
aspect of ERISA is its preemption provision . . .
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1185(a)-(b) (2006).
85. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of
the Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 37 (1996) (noting that "ERISA preemption has created an
enormous, unanticipated 'regulatory vacuum"').
86. Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
87. Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986). COBRA
requires employers with 20 or more employees that sponsor a group health plan to offer continuing health
insurance coverage for "qualified individuals" whose group health insurance is terminated by a "qualifying
event." 29 U.S.C. § 1161.
88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-83.
89. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1251, 124 Stat. 119, 161-62
(2010).
90. See Health Policy Brief 'Grandfathered' Health Plans, HEALTH AFF. 1, 5 (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief pdfs/healthpolicybrief_29.pdf (noting commenters' view
"that anyone who interpreted that promise as meaning that their coverage would never change in any way was
bound to be disappointed"); Jost, LEGAL SOLUTIONS, supra note 79 (suggesting that Obama's promise never
meant "if you don't like the plan you have, you will be stuck with it forever").
91. But see Health Policy Brief 'Grandfathered'Health Plans,supra note 90, at 5 (noting that "insurance
plans have always changed in the past, and would have done so in the future with or without the health reform

766

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Vol. 36:4

grandfathered plans roughly approximate existing plans and thereby preserve the status
quo. 92 Accordingly, the validity of the "you can keep your health plan" promise turns on
what you consider "your plan." Is "your plan" the precise coverage terms, provider
networks, premiums, cost-sharing obligations, and other provisions of the plan in which
you were enrolled on March 23, 2010? Or is "your plan" a set of standards or hallmarks
of typical employer health benefit plans that you have come to expect?
A. ACA Requirements Applicable to GrandfatheredPlans
Grandfathered plans are subject to a number of ACA provisions. 93 First, all plans
must develop and utilize standardized explanation of coverage documents. 94 As early as
2011, grandfathered plans must extend coverage to dependent children up to age 26.95
New and grandfathered plans cannot impose lifetime limits and are restricted in imposing
annual limits on coverage. 96 No plan may cancel coverage except in cases of intentional
misrepresentation or fraud. 97 Both new and grandfathered plans must meet specific
medical-loss ratios (MLR), meaning that large plans must spend 85% of premium
revenue on medical care, and small plans must spend 80%.98 If plans fail to meet the
spending requirements, they are required to rebate the excess revenue to plan enrollees. 99
One of ACA's most popular reforms, the prohibition on preexisting condition
exclusions, 100 applies to both new and grandfathered plans. Also, all plans are prohibited
from imposing waiting periods longer than 90 days.o1 0
B. ACA Exemptions for GrandfatheredPlans
Grandfathered plans are expressly exempted from several key ACA provisions.102
One of the most significant exemptions is the Essential Health Benefits (EHB) provision,
which defines the package of services that individual and small group plans sold in the
exchanges must cover. 103 EHB includes ambulatory patient services, emergency services,
hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance abuse
treatment, prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices,
laboratory services, preventive and wellness services, chronic disease management, and
pediatric services, including oral and vision care. 104 The EHB provisions cap out-oflaw").
92. See Jost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG, supra note 56 (noting that the grandfather rule is not intended to prevent
you from escaping your insurance plan if it changes dramatically to your disadvantage).
93. ACA § 125 1(a)(3), (4).
94. Id. § 2715.
95. Id. § 2714.
96. Id. §2711.
97. Id. § 2712.
98. ACA § 2718(b).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 2704(a).
101. Id. § 2708.
102. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
103. ACA §§ 1302(b), 2707.
104. Id. § 1302(b)(1)(A}-(J); see Amy B. Monahan, Initial Thoughts on Essential Health Benefits,
(University of Minnesota Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 10-36, (2010)), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1646723 (describing EHiB).
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pocket expenditures, and grandfathered plans are also exempt from those limits. 105 Also,
grandfathered plans are not required to cover preventive care without cost-sharing,106
allow direct access to emergency care, pediatricians, and obstetrical and gynecological
care, 107 or cover experimental treatment as part of approved clinical trials. 108
Grandfathered plans are also not subject to ACA's guaranteed issue and renewability
requirements,1 09 or prohibitions on discrimination based on health status or employee
compensation.1 0 ACA's limits on premium rate variation based on age and tobacco use
do not apply to grandfathered plans.111 Grandfathered plans also are not required to
provide statutorily specified grievance and appeals processes,11 2 report on quality of care
improvement activities,11 3 or pay an annual assessment to fund patient-centered
outcomes research. 114
C. Effect of Requirements andExemptions on GrandfatheredPlans
Many of the new requirements and exemptions may have little effect on employer
group plans because those plans already voluntarily, or as required under existing laws,
comply with similar standards. First, ACA operates from the presumption that employer
health plans currently provide at least the statutory EHB 1l5 and likely even more
generous benefits. Similarly, it is presumed that grandfathered plans already allow access
to emergency care, pediatricians, and obstetrical-gynecological care without significant
gatekeeping barriers. 116 Accordingly, those ACA exemptions seem merely to maintain
the status quo. Most employer health plans also already provide fairly generous grievance
and appeals processes, if not the exact processes required by ACA.117 ERISA expressly
requires self-insured plans to provide internal, although not external, appeals. 118 In effect,
those ACA exemptions simply avoid duplication of existing legal requirements or
industry customs rather than alleviate grandfathered plans from significant new ACA

105. See ACA § 1302(c)(2) (defining the annual limitation on deductibles for employer sponsored plans);
see Jost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG, supra note 56 (stating that grandfathered plans are exempt from the EHB); Health
Policy Brief 'Grandfathered' Health Plans, supra note 90, at 2 (discussing the effect of the ACA on
grandfathered plans).
106. ACA § 2713(a).
107. Id. § 2719A(b)-(d).
108. Id § 2709.
109. Id. §§ 2702, 2703.
110. Id.§§ 2701, 2716.
111. ACA § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iv).
112. Id.§§ 2715, 2719.
113. Id.§ 2717.
114. Id. §6301.
115. See id. § 1302(b)(2)(A) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to ensure that the
scope of EHB "is equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical employer plan").
116. See Questions and Answers, supra note 24 (suggesting that most Americans receive health insurance
from employer health plans, and that most of those plans "are likely to already give their workers and families
some additional protections in the [ACA], like a choice of OB-GYN and pediatrician and access to emergency
rooms in other states without prior authorization").
117. See ACA § 10101(g) (amending Pubiic Health Service Act Section 2719).
118. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1133 (West 2011) (providing for a claims appeal process); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.5031(k)(2)(ii) (2010) (specifying that state law external review procedures are not part of ERISA's full and fair
review procedures under Section 503).
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requirements.
Likewise, some of ACA's most dramatic changes for the individual and small group
markets, including the prohibition on preexisting condition exclusions and restrictions on
health status discrimination, are generally unremarkable for employer group health plans.
Most grandfathered plans are already subject to similar requirements under HIPAA. 119
Specifically, group health plans, including employer plans, are already restricted in
excluding enrollees based on preexisting health conditions or discriminating in premium
rates among group members based on health status. 120 HIPAA also provides its own
restrictions on waiting periods, which, in many cases, are stricter than ACA's 90-day
limit. 121

ACA's other required changes for grandfathered plans, however, could be
significant. The requirement to extend coverage to young-adult dependents could
increase employer health plan enrollment and, thereby, employers' premium
contributions. 122 The MLR requirement also restricts plans' profitability and
12 3
management discretion by strictly regulating how insurers spend premium revenues.
Restrictions on lifetime and annual limits could impose significant burdens on plans
because certain covered services can generate very high costs. 124 The transparency,
disclosure, and reporting requirements, grievance and appeals procedures, and other
consumer protection requirements also significantly increase the cost of administering
health plans. 125
Interpreting the "you can keep your health plan" promise to mean, literally, that your
plan will not change after March 23, 2010, is unrealistic. Most employees are well
accustomed to periodic changes to their employer health benefits and annual open
enrollment periods during which they have the opportunity to review the available plans
and change their elections. 126 Thus, even before ACA, we did not expect our plans to
remain fixed in time. The grandfather rule and related ACA provisions in many ways
merely codify existing employer group health plan enrollment, coverage, and grievance
practices. If your health plan currently allows relatively unimpeded access to certain
specialists, does not require you to pay a deductible or copayment for preventive care,
and guarantees coverage at the same premium rate for all group members, then ACA
ensures that your grandfathered plan will continue to operate within those expectations.

119. See Health Insurance Portability and Accounting Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(1996); supranotes 86, 88 and accompanying text (describing HIPAA requirements).
120. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1183 (2006).
121. Id. § 1181 (limiting waiting periods to 12 months, reduced by aggregate periods of creditable
coverage).
122. See Darling, supra note 35, at 1222 (discussing employers' concerns about the added costs of adult
children); Mercer, supra note 58 (reporting results of employer survey about cost impact of new ACA
requirements, including extending dependent child coverage).
123. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718(b), 124 Stat. 119, 137
(2010).
124. See Darling,supra note 35, at 1223 (citing chiropractic, infertility, and orthodontia as examples).
125. See Blakely, supra note 48, at 16 (citing industry consultant and actuary noting additional
administration as one of the biggest changes from health care reform).
126. See Consumer Alert: Health Insurance Open Enrollment: Choosing the Best Optionfor You and Your
Family, NAT'L Assoc. OF INS. COMM'NS (Oct. 2008), http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer-alerthealth_
insurance open enrollment.htm.
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Moreover, if ACA requires your plan to make changes that seem to your advantage,
such as eliminating or reducing benefit caps, extending coverage to dependent young
adults, requiring additional disclosure and grievance procedures, and expecting leaner
operations under the MLR, you likely will not object to those consumer-friendly changes.
But those requirements also impose costs on plan sponsors, administrators, and insurers,
which cost-pressures could necessitate other changes to plans. The regulations
implementing ACA's grandfather rule, along with other provisions of the statute,
severely limit the types of changes that plans can make if they desire to retain
grandfathered status. When a plan violates those limits, it will lose grandfathered status
and will have to come into full compliance with ACA.1 2 7
VI. REREGULATION

OF EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE: GRANDFATHER REGULATIONS

ACA left unanswered the question whether and to what extent grandfathered plans
can change without losing grandfathered status.1 28 ACA's statutory requirements and
exemptions for grandfathered plans generally comport with the promise that you can keep
at least the general contours and defining features of your plan, if not the precise plan you
had on March 23, 2010.129 But the implementing regulations tell a different story. The
Administration's health reform rhetoric was deregulatory, but the reality of health reform
implementation is reregulatory. As an industry consultant summarized, "The rules for
maintaining grandfathered status were tougher than many employers expected." 1 30 The
challenges of complying with those rules will likely result in most plans relinquishing
grandfathered status.
A. Implementing Regulations
Regulations released on June 17, 2010 flesh out the requirements for plans to
maintain grandfathered status. First, the regulations impose additional disclosure and
documentation requirements on grandfathered plans, the burdens of which the
government concluded would be de minimis. 13 1 The heart of the implementing
regulations is a list of "changes causing cessation of grandfather status."l 32 The six listed
changes include: significantly cutting benefits; significantly raising deductibles,
copayments, or out-of-pocket limits; increasing coinsurance; significantly lowering
employer contributions; and adopting annual limits lower than existing lifetime limits on
coverage, or decreasing existing annual limits on coverage. 133 Much fleshing out remains
to be done, but the regulations provide descriptions of the limits and examples of changes
127. See FERNANDEZ, supra note 69, at 6 (tbl.1) (illustrating "Private Health Insurance Reforms Applicable
to Self-Insured Plans").
128. See Fernandez, supra note 56, at 3 (observing that ACA "is silent on the question about whether
changes to a plan or coverage could make it a new plan"); Jost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG, supra note 56, at 2 (noting
that ACA "does not identify the circumstances under which a grandfathered plan might cease to be
grandfathered").
129. See supraPart V (discussing grandfather regulations).
130. Mercer, supra note 58 (quoting Mercer partner, Tracy Watts).
131. Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,541, 34,555 (June 17, 2010) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 147).
132. Id. at 34,543-44, 34,568-69 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(g)(1)).
133. Id.
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that would result in loss of grandfathered status.
With respect to coverage changes, plans may not eliminate benefits for a particular
condition or for services essential to treat the condition. 134 For example, a plan that
currently covers diabetes or HIV treatment cannot exclude that condition from coverage.
The regulations define "significant" increases to deductibles and out-of-pocket limits as
the rate of medical price inflation plus 15%.135 Accordingly, a plan that raises the
deductible from $500 to $1000 would violate the rule and thereby surrender
grandfathered status. The plan may increase copayments by the greater of $5 dollars, or
medical inflation plus 15%.136 If office visits require $10 copayment now, the copayment
cannot be raised to $20 dollars without losing grandfathered status. Coinsurance charges
cannot be raised by any amount. 137 Employer contributions toward employee health
plans may not be reduced by more than 5%.138
The June 17, 2010 regulations suggested that plans would lose grandfathered status
if they changed vendors1 39 or switched from insured to self-insured status. The employer
health plan industry opposed these regulations. 140 Putting plans out to bid is a common
strategy for keeping down costs, 14 1 and ACA's exceptional treatment for self-insured
plans may make changing to self-insured status an ever more attractive option for
employers. 142 Final rules, issued on November 15, 2010, clarify that plans in place as of
that later rulemaking date may change insurance carriers or switch to self-insured status
without losing grandfathered status, as long as the plan does not otherwise violate the
previous regulatory requirements. 14 3 Those clarifications, however, came too late for
plans that already relinquished grandfathered status before November 15, 2010-they are
subject to ACA's full requirements. 144
Additional changes that plans may make without losing grandfathered status include
adding benefits, enrolling new employees and dependents, 14 5 making changes to comply
with federal and state laws or voluntary changes to comply with ACA, and changing plan

134. Id. at 34,564 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(g)(1)(i)).
135. Id. at 34,564-65 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.140(g)(1)(iii), (g)(3)(i)-(ii)) (defining medical
inflation and maximum percentage increase).
136. Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,564-65 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 147,140(g)(1)(iv),
(g)(3)(i)-(ii)).
137. Id. at 34,564 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(g)(1)(ii)).
138. Id. at 34,564 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(g)(1)(v)).
139. Id. at 34,562 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a)(1)(ii)).
140. See Amendment to the Interim Final Rules for Group Health plans and Health Insurance Coverage
Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed.
Reg. 70,114, 70,116 (Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Grandfathering Amendment].
141. See Mercer, supra note 58.
142. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing HIPPA and COBRA); Timothy S. Jost,
Health Insurance Exchanges and the Affordable Care Act: Eight Difficult Issues, THE COMMONWEALTH FuND,
at 18-20 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20
Report/2010/Sep/1444_Jost hit ins exchangesACA eight difficultissues v2.pdf (discussing attractions of
self-insuring and potential adverse impact on state exchanges); Linehan, supra note 48, at 9 (suggesting
advantages of self-insuring under ACA, especially for smaller employers).
143. See Grandfathering Amendment, 75 Fed. Reg. at 70,116-17.
144. Id. at 70,120 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-1251T(a)(1)(ii)).
145. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1251, 124 Stat 119, 161-62
(2010).
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administrators. 146 Plans may also increase premiums as long as employer contributions to
the premiums remain roughly the same. 147 The grandfathering regulations further specify
that employers remain free to drop employer health insurance altogether. 148 ACA does
not expressly mandate employers to offer health care benefits to their employees. The law
does, however, impose a relatively minor penalty, or "free-rider assessment," under
limited circumstances.1 49 The penalty applies only to employers with 50 or more fulltime employees, and only if the employer fails to offer "minimum essential coverage" or
if any full-time employee obtains coverage on the exchanges and qualifies for
government subsidy. 150 If those criteria are met, the penalty is $2000 per employee,
minus the first 30 employees.151 Significant unanswered questions include whether
grandfathered plans can change or reduce provider networks, prescription drug
formularies, or utilization limits. 152
The requirements developed in the grandfathering regulations leave employers little
wiggle room for managing ever-increasing health care costs, and ACA does little to bend
the cost curve. 153 Although a few optimists predict that ACA will lower employer health
plan costs in the long run, most expect that employers' costs will continue to rise at an
even greater pace than recent years.1 54 Currently, employer health insurance costs
increase by an average of 6% per year. 155 A recent report predicts that 2011 employer

146. See Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,544 (June 17, 2010) (listing changes that will not
cause a plan to lose grandfathered status).
147. See id. (noting that changes to premiums will not cause a plan to lose grandfathered status); Jost,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG, supra note 56 (noting permitted changes by grandfathered plans, including "most
importantly-rais[ing] premiums").
148. See Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,548 (listing, among choices for plan sponsors, "cease to
offer any plan").
149. See Darling, supra note 35, at 1221 (noting lack of "classic" employer mandate but describing
penalties and options for employers).
150. See ACA § 1513 (amending I.R.C. by adding § 4980H(a), (c)) (providing details of penalties for large
employers).
151. See FERNANDEZ, supra note 69, at 4, 7 n.19 (discussing penalties); KoSALI SIMON, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, IMPLICATIONS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM FOR EMPLOYERS 6, 33 n.14 (May 2010),

available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/05/pdf/health employers.pdf (explaining some
penalties). See generally HINDA CHAIKIND & CHRIS L. PETERSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41159,
SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES UNDER PPACA (P.L. 111-148) (Apr. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.ltgov.ri.gov/smallbusiness/employerprovisions.pdf (describing the penalties applicable under
section 1513 of ACA).
152. See Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 34,546 (recognizing that in balancing competing interests,
some uncertainties remain).
153. See Darling,supra note 35, at 1221 (noting employers' "greatest disappointment" with health reform
was lack of cost containment and suggesting that combination of increased access and requirements to maintain
current benefits "will be toxic"). See generally Chris Fleming, Can Health Reform Bend the Cost Curve?,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 22, 2010), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/06/22/can-health-reform-bend-the-costcurve/ (evaluating whether ACA will succeed in "bending the cost curve"); Ezra Klein, Does Health-Reform
Bend the Cost Curve Up?, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2010), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezraklein/2010/09/does health-care reform bend t.html.
154. See Darling, supra note 35, at 1221 (noting that the health reform law will not contain cost growth in
the short term); Blakely, supra note 48, at 4-7 (describing recent trends in employment based health benefits);
Mercer, supranote 58 (discussing the health care reform's affect on costs).
155. Mercer, supranote 58.
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health care costs will increase by 9%, a five-year high. 156 Small employers anticipate
12% cost increases under ACA, while large employers predict 9% increases just to
comply with ACA's new requirements, without making other changes.1 57
In recent years, employers' typical strategies for managing health care cost increases
have been to shift more of the burden onto employees by ceasing to provide coverage,
reducing benefits, increasing cost-sharing, increasing employees' premium percentage, or
switching plans or plan vendors. 158 The ACA grandfathering regulations foreclose many
of those options. Plans face the baseline pressures of rising health care costs plus the
added costs of complying with ACA's new requirements, including expanded coverage
of young adult dependents, restrictions on lifetime and annual limits, administrative
burdens, and MLR limits. 159 As a practical matter, under the grandfathering rule's "no
substantial changes" requirements, the only way for employers to maintain grandfathered
status is by bearing the inevitable cost increases on their own ledgers, rather than shifting
costs onto employees. Most predict that the grandfathering limits will be nearly
impossible to abide with in the near or long term. 160 As a result, grandfathered health
plans will likely cease to exist over time.
B.

Other ACA Constraints

Other provisions of ACA, specifically the MLR, "Cadillac tax," and free-choice
vouchers further constrain the flexibility and options available to grandfathered health
plans. Although the grandfathering regulations expressly do not limit plans from
increasing premiums, the MLR and Cadillac tax effectively operate as premium caps. 16 1
Grandfathered plans, unless they self-insure, are subject to the MLR. The MLR restricts
the amount that plans may spend on non-patient care expenses to specified limits. 162
Accordingly, plans may raise premiums but not to cover increased overhead or

2010),
27,
REUTERS
(Sept.
2011,
Rise
in
Costs
to
Health
156. Employer
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/27/us-usa-healthcare-costs-idUSTRE68Q3N520100927 (citing Hewitt
report); see also Behind the Numbers: Medical Cost Trendsfor 2012, PwC HEALTH RESEARCH INSTITUTE, May
2011, at 4, available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/health-industries/publications/behind-the-numbers-medicalcost-trends-2012.jhtml (predicting medical cost increase to 8% in 2011 and 8.5% in 2012).
157. Mercer, supranote 58.
158. See Grandfathering Rules, Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,548 (June 17, 2010) ("Changes in benefits and cost
sharing are typical in insurance markets. Decisions about the extent of changes will determine whether a plan
retains its grandfathered status."); Health Policy Brief 'Grandfathered'Health Plans, supra note 90, at 4 ex. 3
(citing KAISER FAM. FOUND. surveys); Blakely, supra note 48, at 5 fig. 2 (noting decline in coverage and
increase in deductibles); Mercer, supra note 58 (noting increased employee cost-sharing and changes to plan
vendor and type as strategies to hold down employer cost increases).
159. See supra Part V.A, C (listing ACA requirements applicable to grandfathered plans and effect of
requirements on those plans).
160. See, e.g., Jost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG, supra note 56, at 3 (suggesting that full compliance with ACA
may be "a more attractive alternative than continuing to live within the regulatory constraints"), Health Policy
Brief 'Grandfathered'Health Plans, supra note 90, at 4 ("It seems likely that many employers will choose to
give up grandfathered status rather than live within the limits."); Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 58 (noting that
many employers will be forced to make changes to their plans and a majority of workers will be in plans subject
to new requirements).
161. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
162. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2718, 124 Stat. 119, 136
(2010) (requiring health insurers to provide value for premium payments).
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administrative expenses, or to increase their profitability.
Even if plans meet the MLR and spend the specified percentage of premium
revenues on medical care for plan enrollees, they may run up against the so-called
Cadillac tax, an excise tax imposed on insurers offering high-cost health plans.16 3
Beginning in 2018, insurers, including self-insured employer health plans, will be taxed
40% of premiums above the threshold deemed EHB.1 64 The thresholds are defined as
$8500 for individual plans, and $23,000 for family plans in 2013, with the threshold
increased in subsequent years. 16 5 Surveys suggest that 39% of employer health plans will
be subject to the 40% excise tax. 166 The impact of that tax would be felt directly by selfinsured plans and indirectly by insured plans as insurers offset their increased tax burden
by charging higher rates to customers, including employers.
The Cadillac tax was designed to discourage excessive utilization of medical care as
167
well as to generate government revenue to support other components of health reform.
The current tax-exempt treatment for contributions to employer benefit plans may
encourage firms to offer ever-more generous health plans and thereby shelter that income
from taxation. 168 But the Cadillac tax operates as a cap on that practice, strongly
encouraging firms to stay under the thresholds. The Center of Medicare and Medicaid
Services Chief Actuary predicts that "[i]n reaction to the tax, which would take effect in
2018, many employers would reduce the scope of their health benefits." 1 69 As employers
163. Id. § 9001 (amending I.R.C. by adding Section 49801). See SIMON, supra note 151, at 16 (describing
"Cadillac tax"); FERNANDEZ, supra note 69, at 7 (describing taxes on health insurance plans).
164. ACA § 9001 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 49801(a)(2)). Many predict that the tax will be repealed or
substantially revised before the implementation date, but the expected revenue nevertheless was included in
overall government cost estimates for ACA. See Jenny Gold, "Cadillac" Insurance Plans Explained, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2009/September/22/cadillac-healthexplainer-npr.aspx (suggesting that tax was intended "to generate revenue to help pay for covering the
uninsured" and was expected to generate $12 billion in the first year of implementation, 2018, and $20 billion in
the following year); JANEMARIE MULVEY, HEALTH-RELATED

REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE PATIENT

PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, CONG. RES. SERV., R41128, Apr. 8, 2010, available at
(predicting $32 billion
http://healthreform.kff.org/-/media/Files/KHS/docfinder/crsrevenueprovisions.pdf
revenue from excise tax in 2018); Under Realistic Assumptions, Health Care Law Increases Deficit by up to
$500
Billion,
REPUBLICAN
PQL'Y
COMMITTEE
BLDG
(Feb.
22,
2011),
http://rpc.senate.gov/public/index.cfn?p=Blog&ContentRecordid=4dbe7d21-lcab-4bcO-b025-974a20f85543
&ContentTypeid=3dlf05d6-ed37-4dea-897e-e41bafd0el09&Groupid-OcOf43ff-17c7-4379-abf7-1490fibf75
c5&MonthDisplay-2&YearDisplay-201 1) (noting that Cadillac tax would not take effect until one year after a
second Obama presidential term and citing CBO conclusion that absent the Cadillac tax and Medicare savings,
ACA would increase the federal deficit by $500 billion).
165. ACA § 9001 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 49801(b)(3)(C)(i), (iii)); see FERNANDEZ, supra note 69, at 7
(describing thresholds); MULVEY, supra note 164, at 3-4 (describing thresholds in greater detail).
166. Amita Parashar, Health Law or No, Most Businesses Likely To Keep Offering Insurance, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/201 O/Novernber/09/businesses-healthinsurance-mercer.aspx.
167. See Gold, supra note 164 (noting two-fold purpose of tax); Joseph White & Timothy Jost, Cadillacs
Or Ambulances? The Senate Tax on 'Excessive' Benefits, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Dec. 3, 2009),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/12/03/cadillacs-or-ambulances-the-senate-tax-on-excessive-benefits/
(discussing expected revenue and proponents' belief that the tax will reduce health care costs).
168. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing tax exclusion for expenditures on employee
benefit plans).
169. Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary on Estimated Financial Effects of the "Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act," as Amended to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 14 (Apr. 22,
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adjust their plans to avoid the Cadillac tax, however, they very likely will run awry of the
grandfather rules' restrictions on "significantly" reducing benefits. 170
While the MLR and Cadillac tax put pressure on the high end of employer health
plans, the free-choice voucher program puts pressure on the low end. Beginning in 2014,
employers are required to offer vouchers to certain low-income employees in lieu of
employer health plans. 17 1 Employees who earn less than 400% of the federal poverty
level and contribute more than 8% percent but less than 9.5% of their household income
to participate in an employer health plan, or whose employers offer insurance that does
not cover at least 60% of allowable plan expenses, must be provided the option of
172
The
purchasing insurance on the exchanges with an employer-provided voucher.
voucher amount is the monthly portion of the employer's contribution to the employee's
health plan, based on the cost of the most generous plan offered. 173 Presumably,
employers could also choose to extend free-choice vouchers to higher income employees,
in lieu of employer-sponsored health insurance. 174 The free-choice vouchers are not
taxable to the employer or the employee. 175 Moreover, employers who offer free-choice
vouchers will not face a penalty for otherwise not offering employee health insurance.
Commentators offer mixed predictions on employees' and employers' responses to
the vouchers. According to one view, voucher-eligible employees will tend to be
relatively low-income employees, predominantly in retail, restaurant, and hospitality
industries. 176 Those workers may tend to be younger and healthier and therefore able to
obtain more affordable coverage through the exchanges.1 77 If those workers opt out of
employer health plans and leave older, higher risk employees in employer plans, the
effect will be to further drive up employers' health care costs. 178 If that prediction is
see also
2010), available at https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf;
Blakely, supra note 48, at 3 (noting "widespread consensus" that the Cadillac tax "is sure to cause health
benefits to be cut and may mean structural changes to the employment-based health benefits system").
170. See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 81 (2010)
(predicting that the Cadillac tax will "most likely result in reduction in the generosity of insurance coverage for
plans that exceed the threshold").
171. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10 108(c), 124 Stat. 119, 912
(2010).
172. Id. § 10108(c); I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(ii) (added by ACA § 1401) (defining "minimum value"
requirement); Darling, supra note 35, at 1221 (discussing free-choice voucher eligibility provisions).
173. ACA§ 10101(d).
174. Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick
Employees?, 97 VA. L. REv. 125, 160-61 (2011) (suggesting that employer might prefer to offer vouchers to
high-risk employees rather than insure them on employer health plans).
175. ACA § 10108(f), (g).
176. Darling, supra note 35, at 1221.
177. Jerry Geisel, Health Care Voucher ProgramMay Inflate Employer Costs, BUS. INs. (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20100418/ISSUE01/304189969 (providing example of young, lowpaid employee working in a company of older, less healthy, higher risk employees who would likely be able to
obtain cheaper coverage on the exchanges).
178. See Darling supra note 35, at 1222 (evaluating adverse selection potential); Geisel, supra note 177
("Experts say the provision is almost certain to result in adverse selection, inflating employer costs."); Derek
Thompson, Why Employers Aren't Rooting for Health Reform to Die, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/ ll/why-employers-arent-rooting-for-health-care-reform-todie/66373/ (quoting Andrew Weber, President and CEO of the National Business Coalition on Health, "Maybe
we're moving to a system and people get a voucher and they find insurance on the exchanges. That worries
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accurate, employers may have an even more difficult time avoiding the cost-shifting and
benefit-reduction changes that endanger grandfathered status.
Another view is that employers will take advantage of the voucher option to "dump"
high-risk employees into the exchanges by making that option as or more attractive than
employer coverage. 179 If employers can nudge those workers who are most costly to
insure out of their risk pools, they may be able to hold down costs without having to
significantly reduce benefits or shift costs onto employees. Accordingly, the voucher
option may facilitate employers' retaining grandfathered status for plans covering their
remaining lower-risk employees.
One check on employers "dumping" employees into the exchanges, at least with
respect to large employers, is ACA's default enrollment rule. All new, full-time
employees of firms with 200 or more employees are automatically enrolled in their
employers' health plans. 180 A default rule, similar to the status quo bias, has a strong
effect on structuring both employees' and employers' choices, requiring affirmative
action to achieve a different arrangement. 18 1 The default enrollment rule structures the
choice toward maintaining predominantly employer-based health insurance, at least for
large employers.
In sum, the grandfathering regulations are only part of the story. The MLR, Cadillac
tax, and free-choice voucher provisions of ACA further constrain employers' flexibility
and discretion to alter existing health plans. Although the grandfathering regulations
leave open the option of increasing premiums, plans can do so only if they maintain the
requisite spending ratios under the MLR. Moreover, increased premiums eventually will
reach the Cadillac tax threshold, exposing insurers and employers to significant tax
liability. The free-choice vouchers could either pull low-risk employees out of employer
risk pools, further driving up employer health plan costs, or could offer a strategy for
employers to push high-risk employees into the private market, allowing employer plans
to operate at lower cost.
C

PredictedImpact on Small and Large Firms

Despite President Obama's promise that "you can keep your health plan" and
ACA's grandfathering provision, the grandfathering regulations, other ACA constraints,
and market incentives will likely result in the disappearance of grandfathered plans in the
near future. That outcome is especially likely for small firms. Large firms are in a
somewhat better position to maintain grandfathered status but also face pressures to come
into full ACA compliance. Self-insured plans are perpetually exempt from several ACA
requirements that otherwise apply to new plans. Accordingly, loss of grandfathered status
for those plans may be less dramatic.

me.").
179.
Budget
180.
181.

See Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 174; SIMON, supra note 151, at 3, 13 (citing Congressional
Office predictions).
ACA § 1511.
See supranotes 44-47 (describing status quo bias).
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1. Small Firms
The expectation is that small employers will be especially challenged to operate
within the limits necessary to maintain grandfathered status. The federal government
explicitly acknowledges that most small employer plans will give up grandfathered status
and shift to ACA-compliant policies fairly quickly.1 82 The government's low-end
estimate is that close to half of small employers will relinquish grandfathered status by
2013.183 The high-end estimate is that 80% will give up grandfathered status. 184 A
number of factors combine to produce that result. Small employers tend to offer less
comprehensive plans and make substantial changes to their plans, in particular, coverage,
premium contributions, and cost-sharing, from year to year. 185 Those changes, if
unfavorable to employees, would likely take small employer plans out of grandfathered
status. In addition, small employers are less likely to self-insure and instead purchase
health plans on behalf of their employees on the commercial market. 186 In the posture of
insurance customers, rather than insurance administrators, small employers may find
ACA's new consumer protections, including the ban on preexisting condition exclusions
and premium discrimination based on health status, more attractive than currently
available grandfathered plans.
ACA offers various incentives to small employers to encourage them to provide
health insurance to their employees in the form of small business tax credits18 7 and the
Small Business Health Options Programs (SHOP), 18 8 a component of state-based
insurance exchanges. Refundable tax credits are available to small firms with 25 or fewer
workers and low-wage employees that offer health insurance. 189 The small business tax
credits are variable, based on employer size, average wage, and for-profit or non-profit
status, and will phase in over time, up to a maximum of 50% of the portion of the
employer contribution to health insurance. 190 Small businesses may find the SHOP
1
option for insuring their workers attractive because of lower administrative costs. 19 All
plans sold through the exchanges, including SHOP, must offer EHB and comply with the
182. See Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,551-53 (June 17, 2010) (describing predicted
impact); Newsroom, supra note 36 (estimating that while 70% of small business plans will be grandfathered in
the first year, "this could drop about one-third over several years").
183. Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg., at 34,553 (tbl.3).
184. Id.
185. See Newsroom, supra note 36 (projecting the impact on small business plans).
186. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 49, at 2313-14 (noting that self-insuring makes financial sense for
firms with large risk pools but may be available to small employers by purchasing stop-loss insurance); Russell
Krobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good Loophole Deserves Another", 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICs 89, 106-07 (2005) (noting that large employers "have a pool of individual risks
sufficiently large to minimize its insurance risk, reducing the value of purchasing third-party insurance").
187. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1421, 124 Stat. 119, 237 (2010).
188. Id. § 1331(b).
189. Id § 1421 (amending I.R.C. § 45R(d)).
190. See SIMON, supra note 151, at 9 (describing subsidies to small employers).
191. See Christine Ebner et al., The Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Workers' Health Insurance
Coverage, 363 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1393, 1395, (2010) availableat http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=12
339 (summarizing RAND simulation, suggesting that small employers may be more likely to offer coverage
because of "availability of new, often lower-cost insurance options (because of administrative savings, for
example) for small businesses that offer coverage on the exchanges," and predicting "that nearly three of four
workers offered coverage by small businesses will receive that offer through the exchanges").
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other ACA requirements for new plans.192 Accordingly, small employers that elect to
offer health plans through the exchanges will necessarily give up grandfathered status.
On the other hand, the better option for many small employers may be to drop
employee health insurance altogether. Employers with 50 or fewer employees face no
penalty for failing to offer health coverage.1 93 To the extent that small employers may
have lower-than-average salaries, their employees will be eligible for individual tax
credits and government subsidies if they purchase individual policies on the exchanges.
Beginning in 2014, Americans earning between 133 and 400% of the federal poverty
level will qualify for tax credits to purchase health insurance. 194 That option may be a
win-win for employers and employees because the individual tax credit is more generous
than the existing employer tax subsidy. 195 Moreover, some low-income workers may
96
qualify for Medicaid under ACA's expanded income-eligibility requirements.1 Those
options may further incentivize small employers to reduce or change benefits, thereby
running afoul of the grandfathering requirements, or drop coverage altogether.
2. Large Firms
Large employers, by contrast, are in a somewhat better position to retain
grandfathered status. The government expects that large employers will be better able to
navigate the "no substantial changes" requirements, if they so desire. 19 7 By 2013, the
government's low-end estimate is that one-third of large employers will relinquish
grandfathered status; the high-end estimate is 64%.198 Even within the grandfathering
limits on employers' shifting increased costs onto employees or significantly reducing
benefits, large employers have other ways of offsetting the costs. Large employers tend to
have greater administrative capacity to manage plan participation.1 99 They also have
considerable bargaining power to negotiate favorable rates with health insurers and
providers because they bring large, broad risk-pools to the table. 200 In addition, large
employers are better able to spread the rising costs of health insurance through lower
20
wages to their workers or higher prices for their products and services. 1
192. ACA § 1201 (amending Public Health Service Act by adding Section 2702(a)); id. § 1301(a) (defining
Qualified Health Plan); id. § 1311 (d)(2) (requirements for plans sold in the Exchanges).
193. See supranotes 149-51 and accompanying text (describing free-rider surcharge on employers).
194. ACA §§ 1401,1411.
195. See Hyman, supra note 35, at 13-14 (concluding that "low-wage workers ... and their employers are
jointly better off financially if coverage is obtained through an exchange"); Foster, supra note 169, at 7 (noting
that firms with low average salaries "might find it to their-and their employees'-advantage to end their plans,
thereby allowing their workers to qualify for heavily subsidized coverage through the Exchanges").
196. See ACA § 2001 (expanding Medicaid income eligibility levels); Foster, supra note 169, at 7 (stating
that "a number of workers who currently have employer coverage would likely become enrolled in the
expanded Medicaid program").
197. Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,551-53 (June 17, 2010) (describing predicted impact);
Newsroom, supra note 36 (discussing that plans only lose their grandfathered status if they make "significant
changes" that affect consumers).
198. Grandfathering Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 24,538, 34,553 (looking to the estimates provided in Table 3).
199. See Blakely, supra note 48, at 21 (citing business federation representative, noting large employers'
advantages in offering employer-based health insurance, including ability to afford human resources
departments).
200. Id. (noting that large companies can exert market power in purchasing health insurance).
201. Id. (noting that "for large employers the system is very good a creating large stable risk pools").
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Although large employers are not eligible for ACA's small employer tax credits,
they continue to enjoy the existing favorable tax treatment for employee benefit
contributions, which operates as a strong incentive to maintain employer-sponsored
health insurance. 202 The free-rider assessment further encourages large employers to
continue offering health insurance. 203 Moreover, employees, now facing an individual
health insurance mandate will put strong pressure on employers to continue to offer
health plans. Large employer group plans will likely continue to be more affordable than
individual plans available on the exchanges, despite the possibility of dumping.204
Large firms are also more likely to self-insure, 20 5 and this status perpetually shields
them from a number of ACA requirements. 206 ACA, in many respects, seems to preserve
ERISA's deregulatory effect for self-insured plans 207 but does specify how to resolve
conflicts between group health plan requirements under ERISA and ACA. 208 Several
ACA exemptions for grandfathered plans apply to both grandfathered and new selfinsured group plans, including the MLR, EHB, rating limits, cost-sharing limits, and
guaranteed issue and renewability. 209 In other words, self-insured plans, even if they lose
grandfathered status by making changes in violation of the grandfathering regulations,
still will not be subject to those particular ACA requirements. Moreover, several other
ACA requirements that do apply to new self-insured plans, such as coverage of
preexisting conditions, waiting periods, prohibitions on premium discrimination based on
health status, and internal appeals processes, duplicate existing federal requirements
applicable to self-insured plans. 2 10
Given that more than half of insured workers are enrolled in self-insured plans, 2 11
ACA's special treatment of self-insured plans may minimize the impact of losing
grandfathered status for most employees. Some commentators suggest that ACA creates
even stronger incentives than ERISA for firms, including small firms, to self-insure, 2 12
202. See SIMON, supra note 151, at 4 (noting that the tax subsidy for employer-based coverage remains in
place); see also Blakely, supra note 48, at 3 (noting pre-ACA employer tax incentives); Hyman, supra note 35,
at 8 (discussing that the tax code pre-act provided financial incentives for employees to insure themselves
through their employer).
203. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (describing ACA's employer penalty for failing to
offer health insurance).
204. See supra note 178 (discussing view that employers may use free-choice voucher program as a way to
dump high-risk employees into the exchanges).
205. See FERNANDEZ, supra note 69, at 4 (noting that "the value of self-insurance to a firm generally is
related to firm size"); Linehan, supra note 48, at 3 ("To realize the advantages of self-insuring, employers need
to have the ability to assume risk without threatening their solvency.").
206. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§1301(b)(1)(B), 1562(e), 124 Stat.
119, 163, 264 (2010) (technical amendment to ERISA, adding § 715(b)).
207. See Monahan, supra note 104, at 4 (discussing how large group plans remain regulated through
ERISA). See generally supra Part IV (discussing deregulation under ERISA).
208. ACA § 1562(e) (adding ERISA § 715(a)).
209. See FERNANDEZ, supranote 69, at 5 (discussing ACA "patchwork approach to specifying which type
of private plan would be subject to which reform"), 6 tbl.6 (summarizing ACA provisions applicable to selfinsured plans); see generally Jost, LEGAL SOLuTIONS, supra note 79 (listing ACA provisions and entities to
which they apply).
210. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (describing requirements already applicable to ERISA
plans).
211. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting self-insured plan enrollment).
212. See Linehan, supra note 48, at 9 (discussing the effect on small-group market); Timothy S. Jost,
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which would extend the effect. Employees typically are not aware whether their
employer health plan is self-insured or insured. 2 13 Moreover, under the grandfathering
regulations, employees in self-insured plans may have little reason to notice if their plan
loses grandfathered status. Self-insured plans will continue to operate more or less the
same as before ACA, whether grandfathered or not. For employees in self-insured plans,
the real threat to the "you can keep your health plan" promise may not be the inevitability
of their plans losing grandfathered status but rather the possibility of their employers
dropping health coverage altogether. 2 14
The administrative rules implementing the ACA grandfather rule will almost
certainly drive plans to relinquish grandfathered status. The strict limits on plan changes
will be nearly impossible to abide, especially for small employers. Those plans,
accordingly, will lose grandfathered status and will have to comply with a number of
additional ACA requirements. For employees covered by those plans the coverage and
other consumer protection changes may be dramatic, although perhaps not
unwelcome. 2 15 Large employers may have a somewhat easier time operating within the
grandfathering regulatory limits by bearing the inevitable cost increases. Even when large
employers do give up grandfathered status, the changes may be less noticeable to
employees because those plans, as currently offered, come closer to ACA's new
requirements than small employer plans. Self-insured plans remain perpetually exempt
from a number of new ACA requirements, even if they relinquish grandfathered status.
Accordingly, loss of grandfathered status will likely be imperceptible to most employees
of self-insured plans.
VII. CONCLUSION

In an appeal to market-based, self-determinative, deregulatory, populist rhetoric, the
Obama Administration repeatedly assured the American public that despite the ACA's
sweeping reform of the U.S. health care delivery and health insurance system, the

Health Insurance Exchanges and the Affordable Care Act: Eight Difficult Issues, COMMONWEALTH FUND 22
(Sept. 2010), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Sep/1444
Jost hlt ins exchangesACA eightdifficult issuesv2.pdf (discussing exchanges under ACA). The
November 17, 2010, regulations clarify that changing from insured to self-insured status will not result in loss
of grandfathered status. See Grandfathering Amendment, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,116-17 (Nov. 17, 2010); supra notes
143-46 (describing clarifications, allowing plans to switch from insured to self-insured status without losing
grandfathered status).
213. See Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Plans, or "One Good Loophole Deserves
Another," 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 89, 95 (2005) (noting that "few employees know whether
their [employer health benefit plan] is insured or self-insured"); see, e.g., Ins. Bd. v. Muir, 819 F.2d 408, 409
(3d Cir. 1987) (noting that employees in a self-insured plan that contracted with Blue Cross and Blue Shield for
plan administration received Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurance cards, claim forms, and reimbursement, with
no indication regarding the risk-bearing status of the plan or employer).
214. See David A. Hyman, PPACA in Theory and Practice: The Perils of Parallelism,VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=1826292 (challenging
normative conclusions in Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 174, regarding prospect of employers dropping
employee health coverage and tying prospect to Obama's promise).
215. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (describing Administration's paternalistic response to
insureds' concerns about loss of grandfathered status).
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legislation would not affect those of us who were happy with our existing health plans. 2 16
ACA's grandfather rule largely codifies that promise, preserving plans in existence as of
the date of the law's enactment and exempting grandfathered plans from a number of new
federal requirements. 2 17 ACA's treatment of grandfathered plans, in many ways,
preserves the essential defining features of most Americans' health plans.
But the administrative rules implementing ACA's grandfather rule undermine the
promise by placing strict limits on the changes that plans can make without surrendering
grandfathered status. The limits will be very difficult for most plans to abide and likely
will result in plans relinquishing grandfathered status in the near future. 2 18 Loss of
grandfathered status means that plans must comply with ACA's full list of requirements
for new plans. For some plans, the new federal requirements will be significant,
comprehensively regulating plan coverage, pricing, and administration to an
unprecedented degree, at least at the federal level. For other plans, the loss of
grandfathered status may not result in perceptible changes to the extent that those plans
already operate under industry standards and other federal or state requirements. The
impact may be even less on self-insured plans, which continue to operate mostly outside
of ACA's requirements. ACA may simply codify the employer health insurance plan
status quo as comprehensive federal requirements.
The Administration's suggestion that we may be better off, or at least no worse off,
if our plans relinquish grandfathered status and come into ACA compliance, may be true.
Moreover, that result may be unobjectionable to most Americans. The concern identified
in this Article is the operation, not the ultimate outcome, of ACA's grandfather rule. The
problem with promising deregulation while bringing about reregulation through "black
box" means is that the public trust is undermined. There are certainly compelling reasons
to support comprehensive federal reregulation of the health care system. Under the
current regime, insurers and employers to define the essential contours of our health
plans. Under ACA, the federal government sets those standards as a matter of law. But it
would better to achieve that result openly, forthrightly, and transparently. Rather than
publicly espousing a hands-off, no-change posture, while implementing deep regulatory
changes through less accountable, expert-driven processes, the Administration should not
shy away from defending the merits of reregulation.

216. See supra Parts II, III (providing background information and discussing the Administration's
rhetoric).
217. See supra Part V (examining the reality of President Obama's promise); Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1251, 124 Stat. 119, 161 (2010) ("Preservation of right to maintain
existing coverage.").
218. See supra Part VI.C (discussing the potential impact on both small and large firms).

